Winds of change in Myanmar? Implications for international cooperation In poverty alleviation by Ware, Anthony
          Deakin Research Online 
 
This is the published version: 
 
Ware, Anthony 2012, Winds of change in Myanmar? Implications for international 
cooperation In poverty alleviation, JATI: journal of Southeast Asian studies, vol. 17, no. 1, 
pp. 95-115. 
 
Available from Deakin Research Online: 
 
 http://hdl.handle.net/10536/DRO/DU:30050327  
 
Every reasonable effort has been made to ensure that permission has been obtained for items 
included in Deakin Research Online. If you believe that your rights have been infringed by 
this repository, please contact drosupport@deakin.edu.au 
 
 
Copyright:  2012, University of Malaya, Department of Southeast Asian Studies. 
Jati, Volume 17, December 2012, pp 95-115 
95 
 
WINDS OF CHANGE IN MYANMAR? 
IMPLICATIONS FOR INTERNATIONAL 
COOPERATION IN POVERTY 
ALLEVIATION 
 
Anthony Ware 
School of International and Political Studies 
Deakin University, Australia 
 (anthony.ware@deakin.edu.au) 
 
  
 
Abstract 
 
We are witnessing the beginnings of what could well be significant change in 
Myanmar. Elections in November 2010 were quickly followed by the release of 
opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi, then by the resignation of Senior-General 
Than Shwe, dissolution of the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC), the 
opening of parliament, and the inauguration of Thein Sein as President on 30th 
March 2011. Thein Sein's inauguration speech called for national reconciliation and 
an end to corruption, promised a more market-oriented economy, and vowed to 
create employment opportunities. He also pledged to develop the health and 
education sectors in cooperation with international organisations, and to alleviate 
poverty. While some fear this may only be rhetoric, a growing number of 
indications suggest that major political and economic reform may indeed be 
getting underway. This paper traces these recent developments and the possibility 
of significantly improved international development cooperation in Myanmar, 
particularly as it affects the prospects of poverty alleviation efforts and cooperation 
with Western INGO and multilateral agencies. It analyses the implications of this 
reform on international development assistance and cooperation from the 
perspectives of humanitarian needs, international relations theory, development 
theory, and political philosophy. 
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I think it would be fair to say that winds of change are clearly blowing 
through Burma. The extent of it is still unclear, but everyone who's 
gone there recognizes that there are changes. 
- Kurt Campbell (2011)  
US Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affair 
October 2011, Yangon 
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It appears increasingly clear that we are witnessing the beginning of significant 
change in Myanmar. It has now been just over a year since the elections and release 
of opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi, and over seven months since the 
dissolution of the State Peace and Development Council and inauguration of 
President Thein Sein. As the world has watched anxiously, a bold reform agenda 
has been announced, and several concrete steps taken. While some fear this reform 
may not be genuine or sustainable, a growing number of indications suggest that 
the new government may in fact be instituting real reform.  
 This paper explores the possibility of significant improvement in 
international cooperation and partnership with the Myanmar government in 
extreme poverty alleviation as a result of this ongoing reform. It does so by tracing 
the major political developments of the past year, examining any increases in the 
opportunities current international development programs as a result of the reform 
to date and then analyses the implications reform should have on international 
policy drawing from the perspectives of development studies, international 
relations theory and contemporary political philosophy. This analysis notes the 
view of development practitioners inside Myanmar that the greatest obstacles to 
greater poverty alleviation efforts by Western-based INGO and multilateral 
agencies stem from the restrictions applied by the international community and 
draws the conclusion that a repositioning of international policy to expand the 
humanitarian space is overdue, including at least some select direct development 
cooperation and partnership with the government. The next step towards 
improved international cooperation in poverty alleviation in Myanmar lies with the 
international community. 
 
Winds Of Change 
 
Myanmar went to the polls for the first time in two decades on 7 November 2011, 
in elections widely criticised at the time as being neither free nor fair (e.g. ICG 
2011a; Farrelly 2010; Zarni 2011). The greatest concern was that they were 
fundamentally flawed, given the 2008 constitution virtually guarantees continued 
effective control to the military plus the military-aligned Union Solidarity and 
Development Party, allocating 25 percent of seats to military appointees while most 
of the democratic opposition were banned from running for office because they 
had a prior conviction even if they had been prisoners of conscience.  
 Expectations of major reform were therefore not high, even when Aung 
San Suu Kyi was released from house arrest six days later. The new parliament 
convened in January without much fanfare. At the end of March 2011, Senior-
General Than Shwe dissolved the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) 
and the junta resigned allowing the formal opening parliament and the 
inauguration of President Thein Sein. The international community was still largely 
skeptical about change and the resignation of the former junta was widely held to 
be little more than cosmetic (e.g. Farrelly 2010; Wai Moe 2011; Zarni 2011). General 
Thein Sein had been Prime Minister in the old regime and simply removed his 
uniform to become the civilian President in what Holliday (2011a) termed a 
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―military dominated ersatz democracy‖ (p. 10). Fears were that no substantive 
change would be forthcoming. 
 Critics, however, have been pleasantly surprised. This transition has 
proven to be a real change of personnel in effective control over the country and 
significant policy change does appear to be occurring as a result (ICG 2011b).  
 Thein Sein's presidential inauguration speech, on 30 November 2011, called 
for sweeping political and economic reform, including things like: national 
reconciliation, an end to corruption, a market-oriented economy, foreign 
investment, development of the health and education sectors, and work to alleviate 
poverty in cooperation with international and local organisations (NLM, 2011a). 
Many initially labeled this as mere rhetoric (e.g. Kinnock, 2011; Zarni, 2011). 
Certainly, in the same address Thein Sein also declared that Myanmar needs to 
continue to build a strong, modern military to prevent bullying by other nations, 
and his oath to office involved pledging to uphold the Three Main National Causes of 
"non-disintegration of the Union, non-disintegration of national solidarity, and 
perpetuation of sovereignty," the mantra used by the former regime to justify the 
1988 coup and the dominant role of the military over the past two decades (Minye 
Kaungbon, 1994). Together with the dominance of the military and regime-backed 
Union Solidarity Development Party (USDP) in parliament, this is troubling. 
Nonetheless, there are a growing number of encouraging indications that President 
Thein Sein is in fact moving to institute much of this agenda as real reform.  
 
Rapid and significant change has taken place in Myanmar in recent 
months… Since taking up office less than six months ago, President 
Thein Sein has moved quickly to begin implementing his ambitious 
reform agenda. A series of important economic, political and human 
rights reforms are being made… The president has reached out to 
government critics, including Aung San Suu Kyi and the ethnic 
minorities. (ICG, 2011b, pp. 14-15) 
   
 
 This past year has seen many changes. For example, Thein Sein moved 
quickly to appoint a number of well-respected non-military advisors, on political, 
economic and social affairs. One of these is U Myint, long-time economic advisor to 
Aung San Suu Kyi and the NLD, now Chief of the Economic Advisory Unit. 
U Myint has long championed the needs of the rural poor, and moved quickly to 
hold a Rural Poverty Alleviation Workshop in May with a raft of recommendations 
apparently gaining Presidential approval. These include: acknowledging the extent 
of poverty, preparation of a Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP), land and tax 
reform, pro-poor macroeconomic policies, and improving government 
transparency and accountability whilst tackling corruption and the vested interests 
of elites (U Myint, 2011). This was followed by a broader, National Workshop on 
Reforms for National Economic Development in August, with a number of reforms 
proposed by non-military participants being adopted into policy (NLM, 2011b).  
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 Surprising many, there has been a level of democratic debate inside the 
new parliament with quite lively discussions on issues like political prisoners, 
taxation, mobile phone costs and registration of LNGOs (Horsey, 2011), all 
published in the New Light of Myanmar. The fact that relevant ministers have been 
required to answer questions is significant and there have been some 
improvements as a direct result. Likewise, censorship of foreign news websites 
(Hseng, 2011a) and car importation restrictions were relaxed in September 
(Irrawaddy, 2011a)—the latter breaking the monopoly held by the top generals and 
their cronies. Market-rate money changers have been legalised (Hseng, 2011b), and 
the President has met directly with Suu Kyi who came away from the meeting 
optimistically saying, ―We have reached a point where there is an opportunity for 
change‖ (Irrawaddy, 2011b). Most surprisingly, at the end of September the 
government bowed to civil society activism and suspended the controversial 
Myitsone Dam project, a move welcomed by Suu Kyi but provoking the ire of the 
Chinese, who have invested much of the US$3.6 billion into the project (Hseng, 
2011c; Ba Kaung, 2011). The government has legalised the registration of trade 
unions and is preparing legislation legalising street protests under strict condition 
of silence and non-violence. 
 Even more significant is the formation of a Myanmar National Human 
Rights Commission in September. This was followed by the release of 6,359 
prisoners (including some 220 of the estimated 1,000 political prisoners), in part a 
response to the first report by the new Commission. Upon the release of political 
prisoners, the UN Special Reporter on Human Rights in Myanmar declared that 
this is ―a key moment in Myanmar‘s history,‖ and a real opportunity to deepen the 
commitment to democracy (Quintana, 2011). At the same time, he expressed 
concern that ―gross and systematic violations of human rights‖ still exist in 
Myanmar, and that the new government‘s express commitments to other human 
rights have largely not yet materialised as concrete action. 
 Nonetheless, any one of these changes would have been unimaginable a 
year ago. While it is likely that a key motivation behind these reforms has been to 
gain the chairmanship of ASEAN in 2014, which they requested and were awarded 
at the ASEAN meetings in Bali in November 2011, they still justify raised 
expectations. The demands of ASEAN chairmanship and the desire for the removal 
of international sanctions place continuing pressure on the government to maintain 
reform. Significant political and economic reform over the coming years is now 
quite plausible, even likely.  
 Former ILO representative to Myanmar, Richard Horsey, argued in June 
2011 that, 
 
What we are witnessing now is more-or-less what we should expect to see 
if we are in the early stages of evolution away from authoritarian rule. This 
does not mean that is what is happening, but that we should not jump to 
the opposite conclusion. (Horsey, 2011) 
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 Vested interests and the inertia of post-colonial sensitivities suggest that 
change is only likely to be able to proceed incrementally. Certainly, to this point 
reform remains too recent and superficial to have made much tangible difference to 
the daily lives of most of the population, apart from a clear air of expectation 
amongst the people, and changed attitudes by some officials. Reform remains 
fragile, and potentially able to be wound back easily and with minimal notice (ICG, 
2011b).  
 Recent US official comment reflects this tension. The US State Department's 
Special Representative for Burma, Derek Mitchell, commented recently on the 
sense of expectation that ―something is happening‖ in Myanmar (Mitchell, 2011), 
and the State Department recently called the new government ―reformist‖ and 
―open-minded‖ (State Dept, 2011). However, a key demand remains the release of 
all political prisoners, and without that the US Congress renewed sanctions for 
another year in September 2011. The Senate Committee Chairman commented that, 
 
Over the last year the Burmese regime has ―severely restricted and 
frequently violated freedoms of assembly, expression, association, 
movement and religion.‖ And in furthering its hold over Burmese 
society, the regime has committed crimes of murder, abduction, rape, 
torture, recruitment of child soldiers and forced labor – all with 
impunity. In recent months, however, we have seen some encouraging 
steps … But it is far too soon to think that the walk to freedom has 
succeeded. (Baucus 2011) 
 
 US President Obama announced in November 2011 that US Secretary of 
State Hillary Clinton will shortly visit Myanmar, further adding to the credibility of 
reform.  
 ASEAN has taken quite a different position, giving far greater international 
credibility to these reforms, as highlighted by Myanmar being offered ASEAN 
chairmanship for 2014. The announcement on 18 November 2011, the day after 
ASEAN chairmanship was announced by Aung San Suu Kyi that the National 
League for Democracy will re-enter the political process is likewise highly 
significant. The NLD will accept the olive branch extended by the new government 
and re-register as a political party, contesting upcoming by-elections. This re-
positioning effectively ends their boycott of the political process and previous 
demand for the 1990 election results to be honoured. It strongly implies confidence 
in the possibility of achieving incremental change within the existing system, and 
some confidence of fair and just outcomes over time.  
 The legitimacy this confers upon the President and Parliament, and Suu 
Kyi's endorsement of the incremental reform process, are significant markers for 
the international community. Major political and economic reform therefore does 
indeed appear to be getting underway. The only remaining obstacle for a major 
reassessment of international policy towards Myanmar is therefore the continued 
detention of an estimated 800 prisoners of conscience. If these reforms continue and 
are genuinely domesticated, this would bring significant change to the political 
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landscape within Myanmar. Continued reform does prompt, however, the need for 
immediate reappraisal of international policies regarding international 
development cooperation. 
 Reform to date has been more about policy announcement than tangible 
change. The impact of reform on the operation and projects of INGOs in Myanmar 
has therefore been minimal. However, based on recent history international 
responses that engage constructively with this reform, while demanding 
accountability and continued change, will be crucial for continued momentum. It is 
crucial, however, that accountability and pressure must be maintained in ways that 
minimise sensitivities rather than provoke fears of foreign interference, loss of 
sovereignty or of disunity and disorder. Increased development cooperation, 
particularly focused around rural poverty alleviation, and with the health and 
education sectors, therefore appears to offer great potential for such constructive 
engagement.  
 
Reform Implications For Ongoing International Development 
Under the SPDC, Myanmar was a difficult context for Western and multilateral 
agencies to operate within. Negotiating the suspicions of the Myanmar government 
and the deep reservations held by international donors and governments created a 
very complex environment for development, complicated further by the very 
significant humanitarian needs they sought to address with very limited resources 
and mandates. On the one hand, development organisations have faced restrictions 
from a government slow to negotiate the MOUs, equally slow to issue visas and 
then restrictive about the locations and sectors organisations may work within, and 
slow to issue travel permits for foreign personnel to visit project sites. These are 
serious access restrictions that the European Commission (EC, 2007) suggested 
threaten the whole humanitarian space in Myanmar. On the other hand, Western 
governments, international donors, organisational boards and the international 
community as a whole also restricted the humanitarian space, directly and 
indirectly, to put pressure on the regime. One anonymous in-country 
representative of a major bilateral donor pointed out that the greatest consideration 
for Western governments, which tempers humanitarian assistance to the people of 
Myanmar, is that aid must “not keep the regime in power one day longer than 
would otherwise be the case‖ (Source 1). 
 Preliminary analysis of personal interviews with a large number of 
development professionals working in Myanmar in 2009 were presented at 
ICONSEA 2009, and found that, in contrasting these two sets restrictions on 
international poverty alleviation programs, international development staff 
working inside the country widely believe the greatest restriction came from the 
international community through sanctions, low levels of funding, and mandate 
restrictions (Ware, 2009). These, they suggest, restrict the humanitarian space more 
so than difficulties working with the Myanmar government. This contention has 
significant implications. 
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 Prioritisation of Western political concerns over humanitarian concerns 
significantly restricted international development funding. For example, according 
to the International Crisis Group (ICG), in 2008, shortly before Cyclone Nargis, 
Myanmar received the least ODA of any of the UN's least developed countries, at 
just five percent of the average assistance given on a per capita basis. This 
restriction in development assistance appears highly disproportional, especially 
when contrasted with assistance given to other least developed countries with 
―similarly repressive governments‖ who receive substantially more aid: Laos 22 
times more, Sudan 19 times more; and Zimbabwe 7 times more on a per capita 
basis (ICG, 2008, p. 15).  
Table 1, below, contrasts ODA levels with GDP for Myanmar with a number of 
regional and LDC reference countries.  
 
Table 1: GDP and ODA indicators for Myanmar and reference Least Developed Countries 
 
 GDP per capita(PPP US$) ODA per capita (US$) 
 2005 2007 2005 2007 
     
Singapore 29,663 40,907 Donor donor 
Thailand 8,677 8,135 Donor donor 
Indonesia 3,843 3,712 11.4 27 
Viet Nam 3,071 2,600 23.0 29 
Cambodia 2,727 1,802 38.2 46 
Laos 2,039 2,165 49.9 68 
Myanmar  1,027 904 2.9 4 
Sudan 2,083 2,086 50.5 55 
Zimbabwe 2,038 - 28.3 35 
Congo 1,262 3,511 362.3 34 
Ethiopia 1,055 779 27.2 29 
     
(Source: UNDP 2007, 2009) 
 
 While ODA to Myanmar more than doubled in response to Cyclone 
Nargis, reaching US$10.80 per capita in 2008 (UNDP, 2010), this was a temporary, 
emergency-response increase. The return to previous levels has been partially off-
set by small increases from a number of donor governments, but ODA to Myanmar 
still remains particularly low in comparison to other least developed countries, 
rising modestly to US$5 per capita in 2010 (Buncombe, 2011). This time of increased 
activity has created, however, an improved environment of development 
cooperation within Myanmar (Sadandar, 2010). 
 Restricted aid has become one dimension of the international coercive 
pressure designed to compel a belligerent regime into adopting democratic and 
human rights reform. The unintended adverse humanitarian impact of such highly 
restricted aid has been widely observed. (See Badgley, 2004; Hadar, 1998; Holliday, 
2005, 2008b, 2008a, 2009, 2011b; Horsey, 2009; ICG, 2002, 2004, 2006, 2008, 2009, 
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2010, 2011a; James, 2004; Pedersen, 2008, 2009, 2010; Seekins, 2005; Taylor, 2004; 
Thant Myint-U, 2009.) It also reflects donor concerns that increasing humanitarian 
aid may send the wrong signals, inadvertently prolonging authoritarian rule and 
stymying political change (Source 1, 2009), and reflects donor concerns that the 
macro-economic context has not had the preconditions for growth, particularly 
issues like rule of law, administrative capacity and policy weakness such as a lack 
of property rights (Moore, 2009). Thus donors have implicitly questioned 
Myanmar's absorptive capacity and the probability of fungability. 
 The ongoing domestic political reform is rapidly addressing many of these 
concerns. This could prompt international policy change that could greatly expand 
the opportunity for international development cooperation. The next section 
therefore analyses the implications of this reform on international development 
assistance and cooperation from the perspectives of humanitarians‘ need, 
international relations theory, development theory, and political philosophy. 
 
Analysis Of International Development Policy And Implications For Future 
Cooperation 
 
Humanitarian Assistance 
 
The major reason for a continuation of international restrictions on the 
humanitarian space are concerns that human rights abuses, excessive military 
expenditure and the suppression of democracy continue, and are not yet 
sufficiently dealt with. This next section will examine the current reforms from the 
perspectives of international relations theory, development theory and 
contemporary political philosophy.  
 The argument in favour of sanctions, from a humanitarian perspective, 
relies on the idea that the formal and informal economy are largely independent of 
each other, that the poor primarily derive their incomes from the informal sector, 
and that the informal sector is not dependent on foreign investment or markets 
(Burma Campaign, 2004; Asia Society, 2010). It therefore argues that sanctions 
targeted at the formal economy with minimal impact on the vast majority of 
Myanmar's people. Oehlers (2004) argues that these structural and institutional 
characteristics of the Burmese economy make sanctions an effective device against 
the military regime, without causing harm to the poor: 
 
It may reasonably be presumed the negative consequences arising 
from sanctions will have greatest impact on the military and its closest 
associates. Far from the blunt and indiscriminate tool it is often 
accused of being, in the case of Burma at least, sanctions appear to be 
surprisingly well targeted and capable of exerting considerable 
pressure on the military regime. (Oehlers, 2004, p. 43) 
 
It is significant to note that Oehlers recognises this is a presumption. Certainly, the 
majority of the poor are primarily connected to the informal economy, and it is 
domestic policy not economic sanctions that are the greatest immediate cause of the 
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economic difficulty faced by most of the poor. However, the level of poverty and 
the depth of multidimensional deprivation mean that even a marginal impact on 
the poor will have a significant effect on their wellbeing, and this assessment 
ignores the fact that many poor do also connect with the formal economy. World 
Vision, for example, found that the May 2003 US sanctions had the largest impact 
on factory workers in the textile industry (James, 2004). US and European sanctions 
have ―significantly hampered growth in export sectors such as agriculture, fishery, 
and garments, as well as tourism, which are a crucial source of jobs and income for 
millions of impoverished families‖ (Pedersen, 2010, p. 116). Taylor (2004) argues 
that sanctions have created an economic malaise that has deepened the poverty of 
most people in the country, whilst weakening the prospects of sustainable 
democratisation and making resolution of the fundamental issues more difficult 
through postponement and polarisation.  
 As Moore (2011) suggests, the crucial questions are: ―How do we make the 
welfare of the people our main priority? And, would an increase in international 
assistance lend too much legitimacy to the regime?‖ 
 
International Relations Theory: Sanctions as Socialisation to International 
Norms 
 
Risse & Sikkink (1999) offer an international relations theory of the role of sanctions 
in socialising norm-violating states to international norms that fits closely with the 
Western response to Myanmar. They illustrate their model with a discussion of 
socialisation to human rights norms. 
 According to their model, socialisation pressure is triggered when a 
particularly flagrant violation of an international norm activates a transnational 
advocacy network that succeeds in putting the norm-violating state on the 
international agenda. Such a transnational advocacy network, they suggest, will 
typically attempt to shame the norm-violating state by labeling it as a ―pariah‖ 
state that does not belong to the community of civilised nations, then begin 
documenting and publicising human rights violations. Such transnational 
advocacy network began to coalesce in Myanmar after the brutal crackdown on 
demonstrations in 1988, and the arrest of Suu Kyi in 1989. It was solidified when 
the NLD won the 1990 elections but power was not transferred.  
 According to Risse & Sikkink, the initial reaction of most norm-violating 
states to such overt confrontation is to refuse to accept the applicability of 
international human rights norms and challenge international jurisdiction. In 
response, transnational advocacy networks almost always advocate material 
pressure, from targeting the key interests of regime officials to making aid 
conditional on human rights performance. Regimes vary greatly in their 
vulnerability to this sort of pressure, based largely on the strength of their desire to 
maintain good standing with the states applying the pressure. Such a response fits 
closely with Risse & Sikkink's model well with the political pressure against 
Myanmar. 
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It is ironic that as the regime seeks once more to disengage from the 
rest of the world that the world considers disengagement in the form 
of sanctions as a weapon for change in Burma. (Perry, 2007, p. 175) 
 
 Increased pressure from the transnational advocacy network is aimed at 
enlarging the space for domestic civil and political groups, amplifying their 
demands in the international arena. This can result in a backlash and further 
repression against activists. Where further repression occurs, Risse & Sikkink 
suggest, transnational advocacy will increasingly call for donor countries to make 
foreign aid contingent on human rights, exactly as happened in Myanmar. After 
Suu Kyi was released from house arrest in 1995 but defied a travel ban, provoking 
confrontation, advocacy stepped up pressure. By 1997 aid budgets were slashed, 
and the US Congress and the European Union (EU) implemented economic 
sanctions. The impact of the initial 1998 crackdown and the abortive election of 
1990 on aid flows to Myanmar, and then the further impact of the 1997 bans by the 
US and EU, were immediate and dramatic, as shown clearly in Figure 1.  
 
Figure 1: Official Development Assistance (ODA in US$m) to Myanmar 1960 – 2006 
 
 
Adapted from Banki (2009) 
 
 Returning to Risse & Sikkink's model, their most important contribution is 
the observation that, as international pressures escalate, the first steps towards 
institutionalising international norms into domestic practice are usually only 
intended as cosmetic tactical concessions to pacify criticism, rather than steps to 
institute real reform. However, by changing their discursive practice they 
unintentionally open greater space for the domestic opposition and begin the 
change process. The first aim of transnational socialisation pressure should 
1997 sanctions 
1990 elections 
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therefore be to force the target regime to offer concessions which may initially only 
be tactical, rather than sincere reforms. 
 Many argue that sanctions lack coercive force, not being universally 
adopted (e.g. Holliday, 2005; Pedersen, 2008; Steinberg, 2010; Taylor, 2004; Thant 
Myint-U, 2009; Thant Myint-U in McDermid 2009). The significant contribution of 
Risse & Sikkink is recognition that the role of sanctions should not be coercion, but 
socialisation and that the indicators of success should initially be tactical 
concessions and incremental change, not radical reform. 
 Klotz (1996) elaborates this distinction between coercion and socialisation, 
arguing that coercion relies on threatening state survival. Since sanctions are 
generally incapable of inflicting that high a cost on the target state, sanctions are 
almost always an ineffective instrument of coercion. Socialisation, on the other 
hand, seeks to promote the desire for acceptance within the international 
community. Sanctions, he argues, can sometimes do this well. What is essential is 
not that pressure be applied comprehensively, but that it is both targeted against 
key interests and that it quickly adjusts in response to even tactical concessions.  
 Applying Risse & Sikkink‘s model, it is hard to see how poverty alleviation 
interventions constitute key regime interests. Aid given to UN agencies and 
INGOs, that bypasses government officials to deliver assistance directly to the 
extremely should ever have been included within such socialisation pressure. This 
aside, decades of international pressure has now resulted in major concessions, 
which may have began as only tactical measures to deflect pressure, but now do 
constitute real reform. Risse & Sikkink's model therefore insists that socialisation 
pressure must re-adjust quickly in response to the ongoing reforms in the country. 
Expansion of humanitarian space through increased development assistance and 
wider mandates that facilitate development cooperation with the new-government 
would seem to be the minimum appropriate response to current reform. 
 
Development Theory: Competing Political and Apolitical Approaches 
 
Switching to analyse this issue through development theory rather than 
international relations, the same debate emerges. Underlying this analysis is an 
altercation between contrasting political and apolitical approaches to international 
development, encapsulated in the difference between an MDG-motivated approach 
and a Rights Based Approach (RBA) to development (Nelson, 2007). 
 
The MDGs mobilize the classic development sector tools… The MDGs 
are a careful restatement of poverty-related development challenges, 
in language that avoids reference to rights… The RBA rests… on 
internationally recognized human rights standards and principles, to 
which governments and donors are obliged to adhere… Rights-based 
approaches… tie development to the rhetorical and legal power of 
internationally recognized human rights. (Nelson, 2007) 
 
 It is this clash of understandings of the nature and resolution of poverty 
that lies at the heart of the disagreement between international development 
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approaches to Myanmar, accentuated by the highly strained and politicised 
context. 
 The RBA has been termed ―empowerment through external pressure‖ 
(Nyamu-Musembi & Cornwall, 2004). It seeks ―to analyse inequalities which lie at 
the heart of development problems and redress discriminatory practices and unjust 
distributions of power that impede development progress‖ (OHCHR, 2006, p. 15). 
When applied, it enables people to recognise their rights as enshrined in the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, works to build their capacity to claim 
these rights, and works with the state, as the primary duty-bearer, to strengthen 
state capacity to respond and be accountable in fulfilling these human rights 
(Nyamu-Musembi & Cornwall, 2004). The RBA uses recourse to international law 
to guarantee, ―a protected space where the elite cannot monopolize development 
processes, policies and programmes‖ (OHCHR, 2006), and as such is explicitly 
political, putting politics at the heart of development (Nyamu-Musembi & 
Cornwall, 2004).  
 By contrast, the MDG-approach insists on political neutrality, with a focus 
on poverty alleviation on a needs basis, targeting assistance to the most poor and 
vulnerable. Nelson observes that the Millennium Declaration and the MDGs were 
deliberately constituted in apolitical terms. An expectation that humanitarian 
poverty alleviation be apolitical is likewise brought out by many others. For 
example the Brazilian ambassador to the UN noted to the General Assembly in 
1991, 
 
Humanitarian activities… must by definition be disassociated from all 
shades of political consideration. They are, by definition, neutral and 
impartial…. the secret of effectiveness in the humanitarian field is that 
even when nations disagree on everything else, even when they clash, 
they can still agree that … suffering must be relieved.                                                  
(cited in Minear & Weiss, 1993, p. 24) 
 
 Baulch (2006) argues donors should allocate aid based on the level of 
poverty and the ability to make an impact ―in accordance with the priorities set out 
by the MDGs,‖ (p.933) rather than on political considerations. Alesina & Dollar 
(2000) express similar concern that too often aid is not given in response ―to the 
variables that make aid effective in reducing poverty… [but] is dictated as much by 
political and strategic considerations as by the economic needs and policy 
performance of the recipients‖(p.33).  
 While some argue the two approaches are entirely consistent (ACFID, 2009; 
OHCHR, 2006; UNDP, 2003:29), others recognise only a ―limited convergence 
between the two agendas‖ (Alston, 2005, p. 761). To Nelson (2007), the inherent 
conflict is between the key agents mobilised and policy recommendations 
espoused by the two approaches. The MDGs were couched in strictly humanitarian 
terms that seek to make developing country governments, donors, UN agencies 
and INGOs mutually accountable, with a focus on international cooperation to 
address the issues created by poverty, and without any inherent reference to cause 
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or blame. The RBA, by contrast, focuses on national governments as primary duty-
bearers, seeks to empower populations to make substantive claims against these 
governments, and is couched in international legal terms. The MDGs want the best 
equipped actor to address specific poverty needs, drawing on best practice 
international development to meet the most severe needs as a priority, and call for 
international cooperation and partnership. The RBA seeks to reform systemic 
causes of poverty by demanding change of political power structures.  
 Given political power structures are undergoing reform in Myanmar, even 
an RBA-approach should now be considering adjustments and development 
cooperation in areas the new government has shown willingness to address. 
―Poverty has emerged as the most acutely felt constraint on human rights for the 
majority of people across the country‖ (Pedersen, 2009, p. 2), while ―aid has, 
arguably, emerged as our best tool for promoting better governance and human 
rights in Burma‖ (Pedersen, 2009, p. 1). 
 Policies restricting cooperation with the regime in areas of reform that 
international advocacy has been demanding for years only endangers the efficacy 
of reform.  
 However, Duffield (2008) argues that the way in which international 
development agencies create space to operate in Myanmar is through constant 
reassurances to all sides that they are adhering strictly to humanitarian principles 
of apolitical assistance for those in extreme need. This finding is strongly borne out 
by these fieldwork responses, where deviation from apolitical neutrality could 
threaten the operating space granted by the Myanmar government. With 
neutrality, however, aid agencies are confident they could deliver substantially 
more aid to effectively alleviate more of the suffering they see. They thus argue the 
greatest restriction on the humanitarian space is caused by the international 
community and therefore that humanitarian funding (and mandates) should be 
significantly increased. The on-going reform only strengthens their case. 
 
Political Philosophy: The Demands of Global Justice 
 
Holliday (2011a) observes that since the end of the Cold War a new idea of 
humanitarianism has emerged that denies the old principles of impartiality, 
apoliticality and neutrality, and is instead ambitious to engage politically to redress 
the root causes of injustice.  
 
In a post-Cold-War era of humanitarian engagement driven by generic 
notions of global justice, [Myanmar] has for years looked to be a prime 
candidate for political reform, and the main task facing the rest of the 
world has long seemed crystal clear: helping to make it happen. 
(Holliday, 2011a, p. 2) 
 
 Holliday therefore explores theories of contemporary political philosophy 
and global justice in relation to Myanmar, concluding that ―a prima facie case for 
external engagement with Myanmar is readily made‖ based on the obligations of 
our shared humanity (Holliday, 2011a, p. 145). However, he finds it far less clear 
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exactly how such engagement should be undertaken and what issues specifically it 
needs to address. 
 To analyse any such foreign intervention, Holliday (2011a) proposes a 
typology of possible interventions by various actors, suggesting they may involve 
expressive or aggressive pressure, and consensual or belligerent engagement, by 
either state or civil actors. These possibilities are summarised in Figure 2. 
 
Figure 2: Holliday's (2011a) proposed typology of engagement options for external actors 
 State Actors Civil Actors 
Expressive Pressure Diplomacy advocacy 
Aggressive Pressure Sanctions boycotts 
Consensual Engagement bilateral assistance INGO/corporate engagement 
Belligerent Engagement military intervention cross-border terrorism 
 
 Since 1988, Western state and civil actors have primarily responded to the 
Myanmar regime with a range of both expressive and aggressive pressure 
(diplomacy, advocacy, sanctions and boycotts), with restricted consensual 
engagement through limited bilateral assistance and INGO engagement. Asian 
regional neighbours, on the other hand, have primarily acted through consensual 
corporate engagement, and (in some cases) bilateral assistance and limited 
expressive diplomatic pressure. 
 Holliday argues that in determining an appropriate response to the global 
justice demands of contemporary political philosophy, insiders must play a leading 
role and the dismissal of the views of regional neighbours such as China, India and 
ASEAN, is ―worrying‖; their voice should be an essential moral and practical 
precondition for external engagement with Myanmar‖ (Holliday, 2011a, p. 142).  
 The conclusion of his extensive analysis of the demands of contemporary 
political philosophy and global justice is a call for increased expressive pressure 
(diplomacy and advocacy), a readjustment and evaluation of the extensive 
repertoire of aggressive pressures applied by Western powers against Myanmar 
(sanctions and boycotts), and an increase in consensual engagement by the West, in 
terms of both bilateral assistance and INGO engagements. He expresses great 
concern at the imbalance in which so little Western consensual engagement has 
been attempted. He advocates a major increase in effort be given to such 
intervention, ―led from the grassroots through civic action, undertaken… by UN 
agencies and INGOs… a recasting of major power engagement‖ (Holliday, 2011a, 
p. 172). Evidence from INGOs and UN agencies in Myanmar makes it clear that 
despite serious restrictions applied by the Myanmar government, there is 
considerable scope for increased bilateral assistance and INGO consensual 
engagement to be effective. 
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First Steps of Repositioning 
 
A wealth of scholarly research has thus arisen to suggest that humanitarian aid to 
Myanmar should be significantly expanded in response to the current reforms 
within Myanmar, and that international development assistance should be 
recommenced. From a sanctions perspective, the range of tactical concessions made 
by the regime requires a repositioned response, and humanitarian assistance offers 
the best option to do that in a manner that supports reform without otherwise 
strengthening the regime. From a humanitarian perspective, whether one ascribes 
to an apolitical or politically active humanitarianism, development theory and 
contemporary political philosophy both call for increased intervention in the form 
of assistance delivered via the UN and INGOs to help alleviate the impacts of 
poverty. 
 The opportunity now exists, therefore, to acknowledge and encourage 
domestic political reform by increasing assistance to the poor and vulnerable, in a 
way that reduces conflict in the international political relationships and builds 
international development cooperation.  
 
It would be a massive wasted opportunity if the West failed to engage 
with this new government, to assess their willingness to take the 
country in a different direction, and to convince them that improved 
relations are possible if they do so. (TNI, 2010, p. 10) 
 
 Such repositioning has commenced. The Obama administration has 
responded by increasing humanitarian aid to Myanmar and adding additional 
diplomatic ‗practical engagement‘ to the pressure of economic sanctions (Steinberg, 
2010). This has the full endorsement of the NLD, and has involved a doubling in 
humanitarian funding from US$17 million in 2009 to US$37 million in 2010 and 
2011 (USAID, 2011). This is positive first step towards the major increase and 
―recasting of major power engagement‖ (Holliday, 2011a, p. 172) and others call 
for. Capacity building of the technical skills of civil servants, particularly in 
ministries involved in poverty reduction, health and education Is also appropriate 
(Asia Society, 2010). 
 Australia and the UK have likewise responded to reform by announcing 
increases in humanitarian funding. In February 2010, in anticipation of the 2010 
elections, Australia announced an increase in aid from $30 million in 2009/10 to 
$50 million in 2012/13 (Smith, 2010). The UK followed suit in February 2011, 
announcing the largest increase, from £32 million in 2010/11 to £185 million in 
2014/15 (Buncombe, 2011). Australia has also already announced a broadening of 
the mandate according to which the aid budget can be allocated, indicating that aid 
projects must begin engaging lower-level officials (Moore, 2011). 
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At some stage into the future, Burma will have a civilian Government, 
which will face great challenges. At some stage into the future, the 
regional and international community will be asked to help in the 
rebuilding of Burma‘s economic and social structures. Australia‘s view 
therefore is that the international community must help prepare 
Burma for the future. Burma‘s capacity cannot be allowed to 
completely atrophy to the ultimate disadvantage and cost of its 
people. The international community needs to start the rebuilding 
now. Ministerial Statement on Burma (Stephen Smith MP, 2010) 
 
 Aung San Suu Kyi and the NLD position on aid has always been nuanced 
enough to reject aid for the government while supporting strictly humanitarian aid 
(ICG, 2002). The NLD has never opposed humanitarian aid (Suu Kyi, 2010).  
 These moves constitute solid first-steps towards the major increase and 
―recasting of major power engagement‖ (Holliday 2011a, p. 172) the current 
reforms call for, whether considered from the perspective of development 
professionals working within the country, or from development studies, 
international relations theory or political philosophy.  
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